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4.

Due's Lecture:
a.

Due Biography

•

Due Biography

1st draft

Ole Due was born on February 10, 1931.

Due received his law

degree from the University of Copenhagen in 1955, and in the same
year, took up a post at Denmark's Ministry of Justice.

In the

years that followed, Ole Due worked in national service and was
ultimately able

to

serve

all

of

President of the Court of Justice.

the

European

Community,

as

Like John Sonnett, Due devoted

many of his early professional years to service of his country.

At

the Ministry of Justice, Due steadily worked his way to important
positions of responsibility.

In 1970, he became Head of Division

and was made Director of the Ministry of Justice some five years
later.
From 1964 to 1973, Due was Head of Course and Lecturer for

•

post-graduate courses in Community Law at the Danish Legal Society,
the Danish Civil Service Administration College, and the Council of
Lawyers.

From 1964 to 1976, he served as a member of the Danish

delegation at the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
Due served for many years as both Secretary and then President of
the Commission on the Adaptation of Laws Prior to the Accession of
Denmark to the European Communities.
as

From 1970 to 1972, Due served

a Permanent Delegate to the conferences on the technical

adjustments to be made to Community measures in view of the
enlargement of the Communities and on drafting legal provisions in
the Treaty of Accession.
Due was Editor of the Community Law Index from 1973 to 1975,
and has published numerous articles on European Community Law,
•

legal practice and private international law.

He is co-editor and

author of the Danish Community Law Reports.

He is an Honorary

Bencher of both Gray's Inn, London and King's Inns, Dublin.
On October 7, 1979, Due became a judge at the Court of Justice
of the European Communities.

The Court of Justice has powers to

oversee the interpretation and application of European Economic
Community laws.
Court of Justice •

•

•

On October 7, 1988, Due became President of the

b.

••

•

Due Introduction

•

4th draft w/ JDF changes

Due Introduction

The year 1992 marked the official beginning of the European
Economic Community and a different era for Europe.

After over

three millennia of constant political conflict, Europe was to begin
knocking down its borders -- at least economically.

As an economic

entity, a single Europe would pose a formidable presence in a new
world order.

The emergence of Japan as a world economic power has

shown how a nation can gain political clout with a strong economy
rather than with a devastating arsenal of weaponry.
With respect to the legal framework of the EEC, the judiciary
branch is called the European Court of Justice.

The Court of

Justice

of

interprets

the

articles

of

the

Treaty

Rome

and

determines whether the economic harmonization legislation passed by

•

the European Council, the EEC's legislative body, is followed by
each member state.

In order to harmonize the laws of so many

different countries, the European Council issues directives that
require each member state to comply with a specific area of law
harmonization, be it banking, labor, or securities law.

While the

sovereignty and foreign policy of each EEC member state are not
preempted by the EEC, any economic legislation such as quantitative
measures and customs duties passed by a member state is subject to
review and rescission by the Court of Justice.
In many ways, the Court of Justice is a distant cousin of the
United States Supreme Court.
guided

by

and

interprets

the

While its American counterpart is
concepts

of

the

United

States

Constitution, the Court of Justice interprets the various articles
•

of the Treaty of Rome which formalized the concept of a Europe

without

economic

borders.

Since

that

document

provides

the

foundation for the existence and the future of the new European
economic entity, interpreting its articles incorporates similar
responsibilities.

The final decision of the Court of Justice will

affect each and every member state.

Unlike the United States,

Europe's legal systems are not as homogeneous as those of the fifty
American states.

In this context, the Court of Justice may very

easily overreach its discretion.

The Honorable Ole Due, current

President of the European Court of Justice, discussed these issues
in his Sennett Lecture.
Judicial activism by the high court is as much an issue in
Europe as it is in the United States.
the

•

European

controversial

Court
social

of

Justice

issues

as

is

Unlike the Supreme Court,
not

abortion

grappling
and

with

privacy

such

rights •

Instead, the European Court of Justice tackles highly contested
economic issues.

The tension in the new Europe arises because the

EEC consists of many nations with vastly different social, economic
and cultural backgrounds.

Because each directive issued by the

European Council represents a compromise between these different
nations, some nations will have to change their way of life somehow
to achieve harmonization.

Thus, there is a genuine concern for

judicial activism which Ole Due addressed in his lecture at Fordham
Law School •

•

-·

•

c.

Lecture by Bon. Ole Due,
"Legal Remedies Against
the Council's Failure to Act"

•

ADDRESS
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR THE FAILURE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS
TO ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH EEC TREATY PROVISIONS!
Ole Duett
Any discussion of the case law of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities (the ""Court'' or the ""Court of Justice'')
will sooner or later touch upon what is commonly called the
judicial activism of the Court.
A European Community Member State lawyer's attitude towards
judicial activism normally depends on the relations between the
judicial

and

legislative

powers

within

his

country.

This

relationship varies from Member State to Member State, ranging from
the very cautious approach of the French and Danish courts to the
extensive
•

control

exercised

""Bundesverfassungsgericht.''

by

the

German

court,

the

As expected, the Court of Justice

has placed itself somewhere in the middle of these extremes.
A U.S. lawyer will normally try to compare the case law of the
Court of Justice with that of the U.S. Supreme Court, trying to
distinguish between periods in which the tendency to promote
integration has been more or less pronounced.

Indeed, the Court of

Justice's activism and role as intermediary between legislative and
executive arms of the European Economic Community (the ""EEC'' or
the

""Community'')

and

between

national

authorities

and

the

institutions of the Community has led some to compare the Court to
the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice Marshall.
In fact,

•

differences in the Court's jurisprudence may be

observed over time •
United States,

However, contrary to the situation in the

developments

in the

Court's

jurisprudence

are

•

difficult to relate to changes in its composition.

While in the

United States, it is perfectly acceptable for the executive branch
to seek to influence future case law by making appointments to the
federal courts, this is less common in the Member States of the
EEC.
aimed

I am not aware of any nomination to the Court of Justice
at

changing

the

Court's

attitude

towards

European

integration.
Therefore, the different trends in the case law of the Court
of Justice should probably be seen more as reactions to changes in
the political environment.

In periods where centrifugal tendencies

have dominated the political scene, the Court has tried to defend
treaty objectives against such tendencies.

In certain periods, the

political institutions, first and foremost the Council of Ministers

•

of the European Communities (the ""Council''), have found it hard
to live up to the aims of the treaties, whether because of the need
for unanimity in a decision of the Council or because of the
political currents in some of the major Member States.

During

these periods, we may find a tendency to compensate for this lack
of legislative activity by basing Court decisions directly on the
treaty provisions.

On the other hand, during periods of great

political activity aimed at a strengthening of the Community, we
may find the Court of Justice more reluctant to commit itself.
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•

the Court
has no right to take initiatives itself.

It must confine itself to

dealing with the cases brought before it.

It is thus up to the

plaintiff to select the weapon that will best achieve the sought
after objectives by way of the legal procedure used.
It is, however, clear that by means of its case law the Court
has an important influence on that choice.

By accepting a certain

form of legal procedure as the appropriate form to achieve the
plaintiff's objective, the Court can sharpen the weapon so that the
procedure constitutes an attractive choice for future plaintiffs.
Conversely, the Court can limit the effectiveness of a form of
legal procedure so that recourse to that weapon will be made only
when no other is available.

•

It is this interplay between the

plaintiff and the Court that I wish to examine •
My examination will be confined essentially to the legal
remedies employed against the Council's inaction.

However, since

the Council consists of representatives of the Member States, I
shall to some extent have to look also at the inaction of the
Member States themselves.
I shall, moreover, confine myself to the EEC and its governing
instrument, the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
(the

•"Treaty' '

or the

""EEC TreatY' ' ) • 1 ~iifahomti:7'.liatf::;-rit£Ie
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•

The EEC Treaty appears to indicate that the best weapon for
confronting inaction should be the action for failure to act. 4
Apparently, this type of action constitutes the proper means of
forcing the institution in question to fulfil its duty to act.
Experience shows, however, that quite different weapons have been
effective.

The most important innovation in the section of the EEC Treaty
that deals with the Court is Article 177. 5

This rule deals with

the right, and in certain cases, the duty, of national courts to

•

ref er questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling on the
interpretation and validity of Community rules.

The aim of the

provision is to ensure uniform interpretation and application of
Community law in the Member States, but it has proven to offer
other p ossibilities, es p eciall Y [as a] [ii'
""".t he'""'i riif'"W!th'
' ·whld'h"'' 'Wi.
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part of the Member States and the organs of the Community[. Jfflii.fi
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The process has involved several stages.
recognized

that

Community

rules

which

First, the Court
impose

clear

and

unconditional duties on the Member States create rights in favor of
citizens and undertakings which they can rely on before national
~

courts (direct effect).'

Subsequently, the Court mandated that

such Community rules oblige the authorities of the Member States to
set

aside

any

Community law). 7

conflicting

national

provisions

(precedence

of

Finally, the Court emphasized that a decision on

the relevance of a preliminary ruling to a case pending before the
national court is to be left to that national court.

Such a

decision cannot be challenged by the Member States or the EEC
institutions in their observations before the Court of Justice.•
Thus hardened and sharpened, the preliminary ruling procedure
became an effective weapon for the enforcement of the Treaty's
standstill provisions.'

Subsequently, the procedure was useful in

attaining the free movement of goods, persons, and services by the
end of the transitional period on January 1, 1970, although some
implementing

•

provisions

had

still

not

been

adopted

by

the

Council. 1°

Finally, the preliminary ruling procedure gave effect

to

directive

clear

provisions

that

had

not

been

correctly

transposed into national law within the mandated time. 11
In a broad range of circumstances, the case law of the Court
under Article 177 has led simply to the relinquishment, by the
Commission,

of

legislative initiatives as

decision by the Court.

superfluous

after

a

Such was the case with the implementing

provisions in the spheres of establishment and services that had
yet to be adopted at the end of the transitional period.

It was

also the direct conclusion drawn by the Commission after the
so-called ""Cassis de Dijon' '

line of cases, 12 developed by the

Court on the basis of references for a preliminary ruling.

The

Commission concluded from that case law that as a principal and
•

overriding rule, it was a breach of the prohibition in Article 30

of the Treaty to limit, for technical or commercial reasons, the
marketing in its territory of goods that were lawfully produced and
marketed in another Member State. 13

That view led temporarily to

an almost complete halt to the Commission's legislative initiatives
with regard to the harmonization of the technical requirements of
the Member States with respect to goods.

The Commission was

clearly convinced that traders would presumably know how to avail
themselves of the means offered by the Court in order to remove
such obstacles to trade.
Although the preliminary ruling procedure is an effective
weapon against failure to act, its aim is not very accurate.
can

be

used

to

demolish

barriers

in

the

form

of

It

national

provisions, but not to build up common rules, however desirable

•

those rules might be.

Fortunately, the Commission has now embarked

on a more balanced harmonizing policy, and the Single European
Actu

has

created

a

legal

basis

that

appears

to

provide

an

appropriate foundation for such a policy.
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As a
to

rule, fu:ff81t~£f.:A

cases where

there

the application of Article 177 is limited
are

clear

and unconditional

duties

of

abstention or action. Admittedly, national courts are increasingly
referring questions

regarding the proper

interpretation of

a

directive to the Court of Justice, on the assumption that the

•

national

legislature

has

intended to

the

Article

correctly.

Thus,

significance,

independent

provision might have.

implement the

177

procedure

of any direct

effect

directive

acquires
the

a

Community

However, this development has thus far been

primarily limited to the national courts• application of national
provisions that are designed to implement a specific directive.
The

private

institutions•

person• s
inactivity

participation
to

an

end

in

bringing

Community

thus

remains,

generally

speaking, subject to the relevant Community provision being clear
and unconditional.
Instead of referring to the private pe.rson • s ""participation••
it would perhaps be more correct if I spoke of the private person's
""initiative.••
•

In Article 177 cases, the Commission always avails

itself of the right accorded to the institutions and Member States

to submit written observations, and the Commission always appears
at the hearings.
Commission

has

By means of its observations and pleadings, the
made

a

decisive

contribution

to

molding

the

preliminary ruling procedure into an appropriate weapon against the
inactivity of the Council.

A recent example of the Commission's

activity involved a reference for a preliminary ruling intended to
clarify whether the Netherlands' rules on value-added tax (""VAT'')
on trade in second-hand goods were compatible with Community law.
Pursuant to article 32 of the Sixth VAT Directive, 17 the Member
States should have adopted common rules in that area by the end of
1977.

In its written observations before the Court, the Commission

argued that national rules which deviated from the VAT system's
prohibition of principle against double taxation should now be

•

regarded as a breach of Community law.

The Commission argued that

such a finding should be regarded as a consequence of more than ten
years' inactivity in the VAT area.
agree with the Commission. 18

In that case the Court did not

Notably, that case concerned a VAT

on trade in second-hand goods within a single Member State and thus
did not bear upon obstacles to trade between Member States.

In an

earlier decision, 19 the Court had held that Article 95 of the EEC
Treaty 20 obliged the Member States to deduct the residual part of
the VAT 21 when levying a VAT on the importation by a private person
of second-hand goods.

Thus,

Commission had suggested.

the Court went further than the

The Court thereby brought about a

legislative initiative on the Commission's part concerning the

•

establishment of more detailed rules in respect of such deduction •
In addition to its contribution to Article 177 cases, the

Commission has another effective weapon at its disposal, namely an
action against the Member States for infringement of the Treaty
pursuant to Article 169. 22

It is quite clear thatVthit [this) form
t:::::·:·:;;:~;.»-;:;.:;:::;:;::;

of procedure is a suitable means of putting an end to a Member
State's inactivity.

It is, however, surprising that it is also

effective in reactivating a Commission proposal that has

run

aground in the Council . 1_1~::m~t.§:ii:ti::r~s:a~l~P:.~!i§f'.~I%n~~r209l
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The cases on the taxation of alcoholic beverages, 2 3 like the
case on the light tax on Danish fruit wine, 24 formed part of an
attempt on the part of the Commission to arouse the Member States'
interest

•

in

adopting

the

Commission's

harmonization of tax on alcoholic beverages.

proposals

for

the

By obtaining a ruling

that the existing taxation system in a number of Member States was
protectionist and therefore in breach of Article 95 of the Treaty,
the Commission hoped to remove the main cause of the Member States'
resistance to tax harmonization in the area of alcoholic beverages.
The attempt was successful inasmuch as in most cases the Court
upheld the Commission's argument that the national tax system
favored national beverages in a way that infringed Article 95.
However, the Commission did not achieve its main objective.

Even

if some national systems are weighted in favor of their national
products, they are primarily part of a general taxation policy
pursuing fiscal and health ends which do not per se infringe
Community law.
•

area of

The Commission therefore also had to include the

alcoholic

beverages

in

its

general

program

for

tax

harmonization in preparation for the completion of the internal EEC
market in 1992.
An additional reason for the Commission's lack of success in

the series of cases dealing with tax harmonization of alcoholic
beverages was the Court's observance of the delineation of tasks
between the legislature and the judiciary.

In the case against the

United Kingdom concerning the relationship between wine and beer
taxation, 25 the Commission had hoped to force the Court to choose
one of the criteria that the parties had suggested (tax calculation
based on either volume, alcoholic strength, or pre-tax price).
Court, however,

The

left the choice between those criteria to the

legislature and confined itself to a finding that the wine was too
heavily taxed regardless of the criterion applied •

•
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An Article 169 action is especially effective against failure

•

by the Council to act in areas where it is necessary to create new

•

rules but where the Community alone has competence.

For example,

as a consequence of lack of unanimity in the allocation of fishing
quotas, the Member States sought, in the late 1970s, to protect the
disappearing fishery resources by means of national rules.

The

Court, however, held that competence had irrevocably passed to the
Community and the Member States could therefore act solely as
negotiorum
consent. 28

gestores 27

and

then

only

with

the

Commission• s

On the other hand, the Court has not until now accepted

the notion that in such a situation the Commission can, on grounds
comparable to necessity, exercise the power conferred by the Treaty
on a paralyzed Council. 29
A third form of procedure which has been used successfully by
the Commission to prevent blocking in the Council is the action for

•

annulment under Article 17 3 of the EEC Treaty. 30 @:J:\t:Q1]{~:ggJI:jii§::i!§!ii))~Ill
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That

form

of

procedure

has,

however,

been

used

by

the

Commission primarily as a weapon against the Council's tendency to
base a legal measure on a provision of the Treaty that requires
unanimity rather than on a
qualified majority. 32

provision that merely requires

a

In such cases, the Commission has generally

not objected to the substance of the rules adopted.

Rather, its

challenge to the legal measure has been aimed solely at precluding
•

any future blocking in the Council of the matter.

The Court has

•

admitted this type of action •
As is well known, the Single European Act has made it possible
for the Council to adopt more decisions by a qualified majority.
It hasi;[[jlfi"§~i£:~',£J also conferred new powers on the Community, for
example in environmental matters, where unanimity is required.
There is consequently little chance that the Court will, in the
near future, be able to avoid these cases, which often appear very
formalistic but can have considerable impact on the balance of
power between the institutions.
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It is clear from the text of the EEC Treaty that an action for
failure to act brought by an undertaking or a private person
against the Council is unlikely to be admissible.
paragraph of Article

175,

Under the third

natural or legal persons may only

complain in the case of a failure to address an act ""to that
person.'' 33

Apart from its relationship to its servants,

the

Council does not issue acts addressed to individual persons or
undertakings.

The expression ""to that person• ' has been extended,

by analogy with Article 173 on actions for annulment, to encompass
•

acts that are not addressed to the applicant but concern him

•

directly and individually. 3 '

Even then, it is difficult to imagine

any action for failure to act brought by an undertaking or a
private person against the Council that would not be dismissed,
because the case law of the Court on Article 173 is so strict.
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Any

undertaking

or

private

person

seeking

the

Court's

assistance against the Council's failure to act is thus in fact
obliged to use a roundabout approach.

The undertaki ng or private

person must persuade a national court to ref er a question to the
Court for a preliminary ruling under Article 177.
There

is

""privileged
•

no

such

limitation

applicants,'•

the

on

Member

the

right

States

of

and

so-called
the

other

Community institutions, to bring an action for failure to act.

•

While there are odd examples of actions for failure to act brought
by a Member State against the Commission, 37 thus far no Member
State has itself brought an action for failure to act against the
Council.

That might,

of course,

be explained by the general

disinclination of the Member States to seek the Court's assistance
in resolving disputes between them.

That disinclination cannot,

however, explain why the Commission has brought only one action for
failure to act against the Council. 38
The restraint of the privileged applicants may therefore be a
result of the weak effect of a judgment establishing failure to
act.

Whereas

existence

of

a
a

declaration of
legal

measure

nullity brings
challenged,

to an end the

usually

even

with

retrospective effect, the failure to act remains as such after a

•

judgment

pursuant

to

Article

175.

The

promulgate the desired legal measure.

Court

cannot

itself

Under Article 17 6, 3 '

the

duty to comply with the judgment supplements the pre-existing duty
to act found in the judgment.

However,

it is still up to the

political authorities to adopt the legal measure in accordance with
the general rules of legislative procedure.

A direction to the

legislature regarding the detailed content of the legal measure may
only be ordered if

the

unfulfilled duty

precisely in the EEC Treaty.

to act

is

described

Due to the Treaty's character as a

framework instrument, the Treaty will seldom provide such a clear
description.
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In reality,

the Commission and the Member States have

an

evident interest in an action for failure to act only if the duty
to act is
Treaty.

set out in a clear and unconditional manner in the

Only in such instances can the Court declare obiter that

the Treaty provision has direct effect regardless of the Council's
failure to act. f:tfil~a1;rm\lfl!U:~:,:Iae¥!F-~!iJillii!;ttqS,!i!~[iifl!§biJJl::;;11a+~ns
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Apart from the possibility of such obiter dicta, an action for
•

failure to act does not give the Member States or the Commission a

•

weapon against the Council's failure to act which is more effective
than their political means as participants

in the

legislative

process or their legal arsenal described above. ~jjlJ:jli!liJHii;Ji,!trnllii!Jli!
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~D,,1,££;1:2f.ltiit1ie]i£!\tii,\!!?.!~fig~l;ei1;ai!s~IE;\i!~i.me!J.m; [T] he Commission
might have an interest in challenging the Council's failure to act
in its capacity as budgetary authority by way of an action under
Article 175.

It has in fact done so once,

in 1987,

when the

Council did not transmit the budget proposals to the Parliament in
time.' 2

The action brought by the Commission and the corresponding

action brought by the Parliament 43 were regarded by the Court as
•

being devoid of purpose once the Council,

albeit after a

long

•

delay, had fulfilled its duty to act; the actions had nonetheless
fulfilled their function as a means of exerting pressure.
The Community institution that has the greatest interest in
the possibilities of bringing an action for failure to act is the
Even

Parliament.

though

its

political

powers

have

been

considerably extended in relation to the original treaties, first
as regards the budget and most recently in the Single European Act
in legislative matters, it has still not been granted the power to
initiate action in these areas.
itself

of

its

budgetary

and

The Parliament may thus avail
legislative

powers

only

if

the

requisite proposal is submitted to it.
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The Parliament has an even greater interest in the right to
bring an action for annulment against an act of the Council when
the

Council

wishes.

has

not

sufficiently

considered

the

Parliament's

Although the Parliament now has the last word in the

budget negotiations, the Council makes the final decisions in the
legislative area.
the

cooperation

European Act,

Even where the Treaty provides for the use of
procedure

that

was

introduced

by

the

Single

the most the Parliament can do is to force the

Council to comply with the requirement of unanimity if the Council
disagrees with the position of the Parliament.
•

Over the last year

the Parliament has therefore fought to win the right to bring an

•

The

difficulty

is

that

the

Parliament

institutions mentioned in the first

is

not

among

paragraph of Article

conferring the right to bring an action for annulment.

the
17 3,

During the

negotiations for the Single European Act, the question whether the
Parliament should be incorporated into the text was raised, but no
solution was reached.

This rested in part on the ground that the

Parliament had already raised the question before the Court in the
so-called ""Comitology'' case."
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If the ""Comitology'' judgment has met with strong criticism,
that is primarily because the judgment simultaneously sought to
•

show that the

Parliament was

not without

any

legal

safeguard

•

against the disregard of
Council.

its prerogatives

on the part of

the

The judgment states in particular that as guardian of the

Treaty, the Commission has the responsibility for ensuring that the
Parliament's

prerogatives

are

respected and

actions for annulment as might prove necessary.

for

bringing

such

The judgment also

indicated that the Parliament itself has a right to bring an action
for failure to act under Article 17 5, which refers to all the
institutions of the Community.
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The Parliament did not pursue an action for failure to act,
but instead persisted in the fresh action for annulment which had
already been brought before the
•

""Comitology' '

judgment.

The

Parliament's course was surely due primarily to the remarks in the

•

judgment concerning the Parliament's other legal safeguards.

In

the ""Comitology'' case, the other legal safeguards were actually
obiter dicta, but they were highly relevant to the new case because
in the Parliament's view the circumstances clearly showed that the
other safeguards were inadequate.
In the ""Comitology' '

case the Parliament had principally

challenged the content of the Council's measure which differed
substantially both from the original Commission proposal and from
the Parliament's suggested amendments.

The new case was directed

against a Council regulation mandating maximum permitted levels of
radioactive

contamination

of

following a nuclear accident.

foodstuffs

and

of

feedingstuff s

The Parliament challenged the fact

that the Council, in accordance with the Commission's proposal, had

•

based its legal measure on a provision in the Euratom Treaty which
requires merely that the Parliament be consulted."

The Parliament

argued that the measure should have been based on a provision in
the EEC Treaty which requires that the more extensive cooperation
procedure be applied.
It was clear that the Commission, which agreed with the
Council on the basis chosen, could not appear as the Parliament's
champion.

Moreover, there was very little sense in bringing an

action for failure to act against the Council, because the Council
had already adopted the final act.
In addition, there was the fact that the Court, in cases
brought by private plaintiffs, had previously stated that a tacit
refusal to revoke a legal measure may not be challenged pursuant to
•

Article 175.

Such a challenge would constitute a circumvention of

•

the restrictions in Article 173. 47

The Court had also held that

Article 175 is aimed at failure to make a decision, and is not
directed at the adoption of an act other than that desired by the
applicant. 0
In its

recent

judgment," the Court

recognized that

the

""Comitology'' judgment was too uncompromising in its rejection of
the Parliament's right of action.

The Court maintained its view

that the Parliament is covered by neither the first nor second
paragraph of Article 173.

However, the Court inferred a limited

right of action pursuant to the Court's duty to ensure observance
of the institutional balance provided for by the Treaty.
principle,
intended

•

however,
to

is

safeguard

This

limited to cases where the action is
the

Parliament's

special

prerogatives.

Moreover, the action must be based on grounds which relate to the
alleged disregard of those special prerogatives.

Because the case

before it did in fact lie within those bounds, the Court admitted
the case for a decision on its merits.
[This) ~QSitf[ftost recent judgment on this issue!.t\j~\:;\:g,~f,SQifSQ
~''
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does not exclude the Parliament's ri g ht to brin g

an action for failure to act in an appropriate situation as soon as
the Parliament notices that the Commission is basing its proposal
on a provision that does not give the Parliament the desired
influence.

However, it is clear that the judgment does diminish

the Parliament's interest in such a course of action.

As stated,

an action for annulment is an extremely strong weapon and in an
initial phase, the Parliament will presumably prefer to exercise
•

its political influence, now reinforced by some appropriate legal

•

""sabre-rattling.''
In sum,

it may be stated that the Court's case law has

developed a range of very effective weapons to be used against the
Council's failure to act.

This has resulted in various forms of

procedure which, from a superficial reading of the Treaty, might
appear completely unsuited for the purpose.

On the other hand, the

ostensibly appropriate weapon, the action for failure to act, has
proved to be so innocuous that it has been largely abandoned in
favor of those procedures developed later.

For a short time, it

appeared that the action for failure to act might be resuscitated
as the Parliament's only legal remedy to safeguard its prerogatives
in the legislative procedure.

However, after the most recent

judgment on this issue, the action for failure to act has also lost

•

its real

significa nce as a

legal remedy

for

the Parliament.

Henceforth the action for failure to act may be primarily regarded
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